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FORFEITURE OF A GRAVEL MINING LEASE
IN NEBRASKA FOR BREACH OF AN
IMPLIED OBLIGATION TO WORK
WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
By the terms of a written agreement, the owners of a quarter-
section of land in York County, Nebraska, leased the premises
for a term of five years, beginning March 1, 1956, to a gravel-
plant operator "for the sole purpose and with the exclusive right
to excavate and remove gravel to any extent lessee might desire."'
Designated a "gravel lease," the instrument provided for monthly
rentals of ten cents for each cubic yard of gravel removed from
the premises. No further consideration for the lease was set out
in the instrument.2
The lessee died July 13, 1956. From late June, 1956, until
early January, 1957, one of the lessee's sons operated the gravel
pit. When production ceased that January after about eleven
months' operations, royalties of $1,506.70 had been paid on ap-
proximately 15,000 cubic yards of material removed. Operations
were resumed on the leased land in March, 1957, but only small
amounts of gravel were produced each month thereafter. The
lessors refused to accept small rentals tendered for July and
August, 1957, and brought suit to declare the lease forfeited, can-
cel the lease, and quiet title and possession in the lessors. The
district court found for the plaintiff lessors and defendant claim-
ants under the lease appealed from a decree of forfeiture. Held,
the evidence sustained the finding that the defendants failed to
exercise reasonable diligence in operation of the pit. In affirm-
ing the forfeiture decree, the Nebraska Supreme Court found a
covenant "manifestly" implied on the part of the lessees to de-
velop and operate the pit, even though the lease contained no
1 George v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 151, 95 N.W.2d 609, 610-11 (1959).
2 The lessors "received nothing other than the promise to pay royalties
as consideration for the lease. . ." Brief for Appellants, p. 5, George
v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 95 N.W.2d 609 (1959). The lessors accepted this
statement as fact. Brief for Appellees, pp. 5-7, George v. Jones,
supra. Cf. Record, pp. 7-8, George v. Jones, supra.
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express covenant to work the pit continuously, or in any particu-
lar way, or at all.3
This case, George v. Jones,4 is not the first consideration by
the Nebraska Supreme Court of mineral-lease cancellation," nor
is it the first to construe a sand and gravel lease.6 It is, however,
the first Nebraska Supreme Court case expressly dealing with a
gravel lease as a mining lease.7 The purpose here is to discuss
cancellation of gravel leases in Nebraska in the light of the deci-
sion in the George case.
II. THE MINERAL LEASE
A number of statements of law basic to any consideration of
mineral leases appear commonly in the legal literature of mining
and provide a framework upon which the George case may be
more easily considered. Perhaps the first inquiry in this regard
3 George v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 95 N.W.2d 609 (1959). The lease, which
granted ingress and egress over a selected route, and the right to
construct and maintain necessary machinery, buildings, and equipment,
was made binding upon the parties and their executors, administra-
tors, heirs, and assigns. Id. at 151-52, 95 N.W.2d at 611. The lessors
complained that the pit had not been diligently operated since
the death of the lessee. Id. at 152, 95 N.W.2d at 611. Cf. Record, p. 4,
George v. Jones, supra. But the court appears to base its findings
on the seven-month period from February to August, 1957. George
v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 165-66, 95 N.W.2d 609, 618 (1959). Production
during this period amounted to 757.5 cubic yards. Id. at 154, 95 N.W.2d
at 612. Considerable testimony about bad weather, floods, need and
markets for gravel, quality of production, and manner of operation
is set out in the opinion. Id. at 154-60, 95 N.W.2d at 612-15.
4 168 Neb. 149, 95 N.W.2d 609 (1959).
5 See Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 89 N.W.2d 245
(1958) (oil); Valentine Oil Co. v. Powers, 157 Neb. 71, 59 N.W.2d
150 (1953) (oil); Fritsche v. Turner, 133 Neb. 633, 276 N.W. 403
(1937) (oil); Lincoln Land Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 109 Neb.
652, 192 N.W. 219 (1923) (oil and other minerals); Clay v. Palmer,
104 Neb. 476, 177 N.W. 840 (1920) (potash); Fawn Lake Ranch Co.
v. Cumbow, 102 Neb. 288, 167 N.W. 75 (1918) (potash).
6 See Powell v. Cone, 100 Neb. 562, 160 N.W. 959 1916).
7 The parties in the George case regarded the gravel lease as a mining
lease, and the court did not consider the matter further. Georg- '.
Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 162, 95 N.W.2d 609, 616 (1959).
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should be directed toward the nature of the mineral involved,
since mineral deposits in place8 are treated in law as realty.9
While, among the non-metallic substances, clay, stone, and
rock, regardless of exact composition, are generally classified as
minerals, the law as to sand and gravel is customarily otherwise.1 0
The Nebraska Legislature, for example, has classified sand and
gravel as something other than minerals, so far as Nebraska
school lands are concerned.:" Under the circumstances in the
George case, however, sand and gravel could probably be re-
garded as minerals since classification of sand and gravel as
"mineral" rather than as some other natural resource seems to
depend upon individual or statutory intent.
12
To convert the character of minerals from that of realty to
another of personalty, the owner 3 of a mineral deposit must ac-
complish a severance of the minerals from the body of the de-
posit. 14 The technical arts of mining and quarrying provide the
means of such a conversion through physical separation of the
minerals from their natural position.' 5 The owner of the land
" The term "in piace" has a technical meaning in federal mining law.
(9th Cir. 1913); cf. 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 3 at 48 (1948).
See Duffipld v. San Francisco Chemical Co., 205 Fed. 480, 484-85
As to the use of the term in its ordinary sense, see 2 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 587 at 507-09 (3d ed. 1939).
9 See Krone v. Lacy, 168 Neb. 792, 799-800, 97 N.W.2d 528, 533 (1959);
2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 587; 3 LINDLEY, MINES § 859b
(3d ed. 1914).
10 See 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 2 at 24 (1948). Cf. Id. at 21.
" See NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-304 (Reissue 1958).
12 See Anchorage Sand & Gravel Co. v. Schubert, 114 F. Supp. 436 (D.
Alaska 1953), aff'd 224 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1955); Holloway Gravel
Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 9 So.2d 228 (1942); Puget Mill Co. v.
Duecy, 1 Wash.2d 421, 96 P.2d 571 (1939). Cf. 58 C.J.S. Mines and
Minerals § 2 at 21-22 (1948).
13 "Before severance of the mineral estate the owner of real property
has title not only to the land surface, but to that beneath and above
the surface." Jones v. Brown, 211 Ark. 164, 167, 199 S.W.2d 973,
974 (1947). As to sovereign rights in certain minerals, see 1 THOMP-
SON, REAL PROPERTY § 88 (rev. perm. ed. 1939).
14 See, e.g., Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762 (1877); Atlas Milling Co. v.
Jones, 115 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1940); Glencoe Sand & Gravel Co. v.
Hudson Bros. Commission Co., 138 Mo. 439, 40 S.W. 93 (1897).
15 On mining in general, see e.g., Behre & Arbiter, "Distinctive Features
of the Mineral Industries," ECONOMICS OF THE MINERAL INDUS-
TRIES 43 (1959); STOCES, INTRODUCTION TO MINING (1st Eng-
lish ed. 1954); LEWIS, ELEMENTS OF MINING (2d ed. 1941).
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often delegates this extraction of the minerals to another, a dele-
gation commonly classified, according to the type of right granted,
as: (1) "Simple permission to mine;"'16 (2) a "right to mine;' 17
or (3) a "mining lease" of the property.' s The conventional min-
ing or mineral lease has been distinguished from the ordinary
lease largely by the fact that it exempts the lessee from liability
for the "waste" occasioned by proper removal of the minerals. 19
The methods provided by a mineral lease for the payment of
rent differ. 20  Under some mineral leases rent commonly takes
the form of a share of the product removed,2 1 while in others
rent is regarded as a share of the gross profit realized by the lessee.
22
Such a lease is generally recognized "as a conveyance of an in-
terest in the mining property."23
16 "Simple permission" to extract minerals should probably be consid-
ered a grant of a "license to mine." See 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra
note 8, § 588 at 511. But see 3 LINDLEY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 859a.
17 A "right to mine," not coupled with an interest in the minerals mined
until after extraction is considered a profit A prendre. See 2 TIF-
FANY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 588 at 511. Cf. 3 LINDLEY, op. cit. supra
note 9, § 860.
Is As to mining leases in general, see 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 8,
§ 588; 1 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 13, §§ 85-106; MORRISON,
MINING RIGHTS 359-79 (16th ed. 1936); 3 LINDLEY, op. cit. supra
note 9, § 861; Cf. "Uranium Mining Lease," 27 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
425 (1955). As to mining leases in Nebraska, see Clay v. Palmer,
104 Neb. 476, 177 N.W. 840 (1920); Fawn Lake Ranch Co. v. Cum-
bow, 102 Neb. 288, 167 N.W. 75 (1918). As to 'the use of the term
"lease," see, e.g., People ex rel. Hargrave v. Phillips, 394 Ill. 119, 67
N.E.2d 281 (1946).
19 Clay v. Palmer, 104 Neb. 476, 177 N.W. 840 (1920), citing Fawn Lake
Ranch Co. v. Cumbow, 102 Neb. 288, 167 N.W. 75 (1918).
20 As to rents under mineral leases, see, e.g., Miller v. Carr, 137 Fla.
114, 188 So. 103 (1939).
21 See, e.g., Wright v. Brush, 115 F.2d 265, 267 (10th Cir. 1940), where
a "royalty" to a lessor of a share of the product produced is dis-
tinguished from other types of royalties, including an "overriding
royalty" on the working interest of the lessee.
22 See Homestake Exploration Corp. v. Schoregge, 81 Mont. 604, 264
Pac. 388, 392 (1928).
23 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 164 (1948). Cf. Fawn Lake Ranch
Co. v. Cumbow, 102 Neb. 288, 167 N.W. 75 (1918); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 76-201 (Reissue 1958). See also Shoaff v. Gage, 163 F. Supp. 179
(D. Neb. 1958); 36 AM. JUR. Mines and Minerals § 45 (1941); Shokes,
"Possible Treatment in Nebraska of a Lessee's Interest Under an Oil
and Gas Lease," 31 NEB. L. REV. 374 (1952).
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III. LOSING THE MINERAL LEASE
Although there is considerable confusion surrounding the cir-
cumstances under which a mineral lessee loses his rights, it is
possible to abstract from the cases and from leading secondary
authorities a consistent doctrinal pattern in the field.2 4  Putting
aside cases in which the lease expires through the ending of the
term,23 and those in which a surrender is made,2 6 the major con-
cern in this area is a failure on the part of the lessee to work the
premises as fully as the lessor would like. Assuming then a
judicial finding that the lessee did not develop or operate a min-
eral lease according to his duty in the premises, the following
general, though not universal, pattern can be set out:
1. Abandonment
A tenant may be found to have abandoned his lease as a mat-
ter of fact, and such intentional conduct is distinguishable from a
breach of an obligation which would result in forfeiture.2 7  If a
mining lease of minerals in place were regarded as a sale of a
possessory interest in real property, as sometimes occurs,2 8 aban-
donment could not result from non-user.2 9 Abandonment of a
non-possessory or incorporeal interest in personal property is
possible and can be treated as a surrender by operation of law.30
24 It has been said that, generally, the ordinary rules of landlord and
tenant are similar to the rules applicable to mining leases. See 58
C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 173 at 368 (1948). The rule is not al-
ways reliable, as will be seen.
25 Unless extended or renewed, expiration of the term of the lease con-
cludes the estate conveyed by the instrument. See 1 TIFFANY,
op. cit. supra note 8, § 147.
20 Surrender of the lease by agreement between the parties or by mutual
consent will also conclude the estate. See 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra
note 8, § 150; 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 173 at 370-71 (1948).
27 See 36 AM. JUR. Mines and Minerals § 58 (1941). Cf. Hummel v.
McFadden, 395 Pa. 543, 150 A.2d 856 (1959); Brown v. Wilmore Coal
Co., 153 Fed. 143 (3d Cir. 1907); Cleveland Stone Co. v. Hollingworth,
63 S.E. 586, 262 N.W. 171 (1935). See also 58 C.J.S. Mines and
Minerals § 173 at 371-72 (1948).
28 See 36 AM. JUR. Mines and Minerals § 43 (1941).
29 Id. § 58. Cf. Hummel v. McFadden, 395 Pa. 543, 150 A.2d 856 (1959).
30 See 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 173 at 371 (1948). But see, e.g.,
Ellis v. Brown, 177 F.2d 677, 680 (6th Cir. 1949).
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2. Special limitation
The estate of the lessee may be characterized as existing
under the "special limitation" of the operating duty, breach of
which works an "automatic termination" of the estate.31
3. Conditions
While an estate on special limitation is concluded by force of
the limitation itself, an estate on condition creates an optional
right in the person benefited by the condition and does not come
to an end until that person exercises his option by making an
entry or claim.32 An estate on condition may appear in one of
several forms: 33
a. Condition precedent. A condition precedent to the vesting
of an estate, failure of which concludes the prospect or possibility
of commencement of the term conveyed by a lease is a well-
recognized form of condition.34
b. Condition precedent to continuance of an estate. Conditions
precedent are usually thought of as controlling future possession,
and if a mineral lessee's duty to develop or work the leased
premises is regarded as a condition precedent to continuance of
his estate in the minerals, breach of that duty might so conclude
his rights to the minerals.35
31 See 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 185. An automatic termina-
tion on occurrence of a specified event is usually referred to as an
estate on special limitation. Id. § 217. But, an "estate for years
subject to a rent cannot, however, ordinarily be regarded as one on
special limitation, if it is to terminate on the contingency of a default
in some matter by the lessee, even though it is expressly provided
that the lease shall be 'void' on such default, such a provision being
regarded as a condition, and not as a limitation." Id. § 219 at 382-83.
But see Valentine Oil Co. v. Powers, 157 Neb. 71, 59 N.W.2d 150 (1953),
where the court treats an "unless" clause in an oil lease as a special
limitation, citing RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 23 (1936). Accord,
Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 413, 89 N.W.2d 245, 253(1958). See also Foster, "Nebraska Landlord and Tenant," 4 NEB.
L. BULL. 317, 348 (1926). The illustrations to the RESTATEMENT,
supra, do not, however, include the case of an estate for years sub-ject to rent.
'2See 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 188.
33 Id. § 185.
34 Id. §§ 185-86.
35 Id. § 185 at 299. Cf., e.g., SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 300 (perm.
ed. 1959).
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c. Condition subsequent. The condition subsequent is the most
common form of condition employed to control a lessee's activity
under most forms of leases. 3 6 The remedy available to the grantor
of an estate on condition subsequent ordinarily depends upon the
express form of the condition, that is, the presence or absence of
a forfeiture or re-entry clause:
(i) Condition subsequent without an express forfeiture
clause. In the absence of a clause in the lease expressly
stipulating the right to forfeit, the breach of even an express
condition does not necessarily sustain a claim of forfeiture
for breach.37
(ii) Condition subsequent with an express forfeiture clause.
Where a lease contains an express forfeiture clause, a breach
of a condition subsequent will entitle the lessor to declare a
forfeiture and seek cancellation of the lease, provided the
condition is included within the reach of the forfeiture
clause.38
4. Covenant
Where the lessee's duty to operate is contained in a covenant,
standing alone, breach of the covenanted obligation gives the les-
sor a right to an action for damages, or perhaps an action in
equity for specific performance, but the lessee does not lose his
lease.3 0
5. Covenant coupled with a condition
Where a covenant provides for a lessee's duty in the premises
and that covenant is coupled with a condition subsequent, espe-
cially a condition subsequent in the form which includes a right
to forfeit or to re-enter, the lessor may proceed toward cancella-
tion of the lease in the event of breach by the lessee.40
36 See 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 187.
37 Id. §§ 152, 187. Where a forfeiture clause provides expressly for
certain designated grounds permitting forfeiture, other grounds will
not suffice. Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291,
112 S.E. 512 (1922). Cf. Chesnut v. Master Laboratories, 148 Neb.
378, 27 N.W.2d 541 (1947); 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 173 (1948).
38 See 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 152, 187-88; 58 C.J.S. Mines
and Minerals § 173 at 369 (1948>. See also note 37 supra.
39 See 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 188 at 302-03. Cf. 51 C.J.S.
Landlord and Tenant § 104 at 683 (1947).
40 See 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 8, 188 at 302-03.
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IV. FORFEITURE FOR BREACH OF AN IMPLIED
OBLIGATION TO DEVELOP OR
WORK A MINERAL LEASE
The question of what remedy is available to a lessor, where
his lessee's failure to develop or work a mineral lease constitutes
a breach only of an implied obligation, remains. An obligation
to develop or work a mine under a mineral lease, if not expressly
provided by covenant or condition, is imposed upon the lessee by
necessary implication to protect the lessor where the lease pro-
vides for royalties on the product mined as the only considera-
tion for the lease. 41 It would seem that the obligation to develop
or work a mineral lease with reasonable diligence would provide
the lessor with an action for damages for breach as in the case
of an express covenant standing alone, where that obligation is
merely implied (whether regarded as an implied covenant or as
an implied condition). Furthermore, the lessor would be thought
limited to his action for damages under the doctrinal pattern set
out earlier-at least in the absence of an express forfeiture
clause.42 Such is the law of landlord and tenant,4 3 but so far as
mineral leases are concerned the authorities are in conflict.44 For-
feiture is a generally recognized remedy for breach of the implied
obligation to develop or work a mineral lease,4 5 although there
is some authority against this view. 46 One writer has suggested
a careful rationalization of the prevailing doctrine of forfeiture
in other terms: 47
By some decisions, if the rent is, by the terms of the lease,
entirely dependent on the extraction of ore, a covenant on the
41 See 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 183 (1948); 36 AM. JUR. Mines
and Minerals § 52 at 316 (1941). The absence of a fixed periodic
rent in lieu of production may lead to this implied obligation. See
Frierson v. International Agricultural Corp., 24 Tenn. App. 616, 148
S.W.2d 27 (1940). Cf. 36 AM. JUR. Mines and Minerals § 60 (1941).
But see, e.g., Killebrew v. Murray, 151 Ky. 345, 151 S.W. 662 (1912).
42 See notes 37, 39-40 supra and accompanying text. As to conditions
implied in law, especially in connection with various statutory pro-
visions, see 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra. note 8, § 189.
43 See 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 104 (1947).
44 The mineral lease cases are collected in Annot., 60 A.L.R. 901, 922-26
(1929). Cf. materials cited in note 45 infra, and the cases there cited.
45 See MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES
§§ 159-60; 216-23 (2d ed. 1940); 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 184
at 394 (1948); and note 44 supra.
46 Ibid. See also, e.g., Continental Fuel Co., v. Iaden, 182 Ky. 8, 106
S.W. 8 (1918).
47 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 588 at 514-15.
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part of the lessee is to be implied that he will work the claim
or mine with reasonable diligence, and occasionally it has even
been decided that, although there is no express provision to that
effect, the lessor may assert a forfeiture for failure to work. It
would, however, be more in accord with principle to base the rights
of the lessor in such case, as to resumption of possession, upon the
theory that the failure to work involves an offer to relinquish pos-
session which the lessor may accept, thereby effecting a surrender
by operation of law, or upon the theory that a promise to work the
mine is to be implied, and that upon the lessee's repudiation of that
promise the other party may rescind and recover the consideration
for the promise, that is, the possession of the land.
The distinction suggested is based on principle and does not go
to the question of the necessity of forfeiture as a remedy. Doubt-
less the exact form of the obligation-condition or covenant, ex-
press or implied-is of less importance than the nature of the
remedy applied in case of breach, at least so far as the parties to
the lease are concerned. Loss of a lease of any kind may be such
a drastic penalty to apply to a lessee in many cases that it merits
further consideration here. A number of Nebraska cases and
statutes are available and supply an opening for analysis.
V. LOSING A MINERAL LEASE IN NEBRASKA
A. CASES
Loss of a mineral lease in Nebraska appellate cases has
involved, prior to the George case, a question of abandonment. 48
In Clay v. Palmer,49 evidence was found sufficient to deny aban-
donment of a potash lease. The court said in dictum:50
In such an instrument it is implied that the refusal or neglect
of the lessee to work the deposits, if continued for such a length
of time as to indicate that the enterprise was wholly abandoned,
would work a forfeiture of the lease.
In Lincoln Land Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Co.,51 an oil and gas
lease (by its terms a mining lease) was cancelled where the de-
fendant lessee violated an agreement to drill or pay rentals, re-
moved its rigging, and surrendered possession of the property.
48 See Valentine Oil Co. v. Powers, 157 Neb. 71, 59 N.W.2d 150 (1953);
Lincoln Land Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 109 Neb. 652, 192 N.W.
219 (1923); Clay v. Palmer, 104 Neb. 476, 177 N.W. 840 (1920). But
see Fritsche v. Turner, 133 Neb. 633, 276 N.W. 403 (1937) (cancellation
by express terms of a lease).
49 104 Neb. 476, 177 N.W. 840 (1920).
G0 Id. at 484, 177 N.W. at 843.
51 109 Neb. 652, 192 N.W. 219 (1923).
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Under express terms of the lease, nonperformance for two years
was a ground of forfeiture by the lessor. Held, the lease was
terminated or abandoned by the lessee's failure to prospect, pro-
duce, or pay rentals over a period in excess of ten years. This
case has been criticized as a case in which "the term of the lease
simply has expired by operation of the express provisions of the
instrument," rather than one constituting a true example of aban-
donment.52 The pertinent language is, however, quoted with ap-
proval in Valentine Oil Co. v. Powers.5 3 Although the law is
not clear, abandonment and forfeiture are not synomymous; aban-
donment is regarded as a voluntary act dependent upon the in-
tent of the lessee while forfeiture is thought to be coercive. 4
Indeed, abandonment as a requisite of forfeiture was denied in
the George case, while forfeiture as a remedy in case of breach
of an implied covenant to work a gravel lease or to market the
product was expressly approved.r5
The implied obligation is an established feature of the law
of solid-mineral leases,5 6 and is also a familiar problem in the
law of oil and gas leases,57 but the Nebraska oil and gas cases
have so far involved expiration according to express terms of
particular leases. 58 The Nebraska Supreme Court has distin-
guished "termination" from "forfeiture,'" 9 and a series of Ne-
52 MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 45, § 8 at 30.
53 157 Neb. 71, 84, 59 N.W.2d 150, 159 (1953).
54 Coleman v. Mountain Mesa Uranium Corp., 257 F.2d 382, 383-84
(10th Cir. 1958). Cf. Iummel v. McFadden, 395 Pa. 543, 556-57, 150
A.2d 856, 862 (1959); 36 AM. JUR. Mines and Minerals § 58 (1941).
55 George v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 162-64, 95 N.W.2d 609, 616-17 (1959).
56 See Carter v. Certain-Teed Products Corp., 102 F. Supp. 280, 290-91
(N.D. Iowa 1952), remanded to modify on another point, 200 F.2d
754 (8th Cir. 1953); MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 45, § 218, n. 10 at
456-57. Cf. Amnot. 60 A.L.R. 901 (1929). But see United Feldspar
and Minerals Corp. v. Bumpus, 142 Me. 230, 49 A.2d 473 (1946).
57 See MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES
(2d ed. 1940); 2-3 SUMMERS, op. cit. supra note 35, §§ 391-510;
BROWN, OIL AND GAS LEASES §§ 16.01-.04 (1958); GLASSMIRE,
OIL AND GAS LEASES AND ROYALTIES §§ 65-66 (2d ed. 1938).
Cf. 3 LINDLEY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 862.
58 See Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 89 N.W.2d 245
(1958); Valentine Oil Co. v. Powers, 157 Neb. 71, 59 N.W.2d 150 (1953);
Fritsche v. Turner, 133 Neb. 633, 276 N.W. 403 (1937); Lincoln Land
Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 109 Neb. 652, 192 N.W. 219 (1923).
59 Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 424, 89 N.W.2d 245,
254 (1958), quoting Kugel v. Young, 132 Colo. 529, 537, 291 P.2d
695, 700 (1956).
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braska decisions involving delay rental "unless" clauses in oil
and gas leases has resulted in "automatic termination" of leases
where a lessee violated express stipulations of his lease.6 0 Re-
cently, however, in Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,61 the same
court held that, in the absence of an express forfeiture clause,
an oil and gas lease would not terminate automatically during
the primary term of the lease on the failure of the lessee to pro-
duce oil in paying quantities.
B. STATUTES
The Long case arose under the Nebraska statutes providing
for cancellation of a recorded oil, gas, or mineral lease.62 A les-
sor claiming forfeiture of such a lease by his lessee may bring an
action in equity to cancel the lease and quiet title to the mineral
rights in the lessor, however, whether the lease is recorded or
not.6
3
If an oil, gas, or other mineral lease has been recorded in the
county in which the leased land is located, a means of recordation
of surrender or forfeiture has been provided.6 4  These statutes
60 Valentine Oil Co. v. Powers, 157 Neb. 71, 59 N.W.2d 150 (1953);
Fritsche v. Turner, 133 Neb. 633, 276 N.W. 403 (1937); Lincoln Land
Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 109 Neb. 652, 192 N.W. 219 (1923).
But see Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 89 N.W.2d
245 (1958).
61 166 Neb. 410, 89 N.W.2d 245 (1958). This case involved, inter alia,
construction of a production requirement in the habendum clause
of an oil and gas aease. The court stressed that the lessee had been
beset by technical dificulties in operation of a well; that production
had not entirely ceased; and that the lessee had developed the premises
in good faith and with reasonable diligence during the primary term of
the lease.
62 The present Nebraska statutes, infra notes 63-64, are not the first
on the subject. See NEB. COMP. STAT. (1929) §§ 57-207- 09, which
provided for forfeiture of oil, gas, or other mineral leases in event
of the aessee's default in certain obligations. For a discussion of these
sections, which were repealed by Neb. Laws c. 70, § 1 (1939), see MER-
RILL, op. cit. supra note 57, § 215 at 450-53.
63 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,112-20 (Reissue 1956). See also Long
v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 415, 89 N.W.2d 245, 249 (1958).
64 As to written surrender of the lease, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-201
(Supp. 1957). Affidavits of forfeiture are provided. Id. § 57-204(2).
As to form and contents of the affidavit, see Id. § 57-202. It has
been made the duty of the lessee to execute and record a surrender
of the lease when the lease shall "become forfeited." Id. § 57-201.
Provision is made for notice to the lessee if the lessee fails or neglects
to execute and record a surrender. Id. § 57-202. In the event of such
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have been criticized at superfluous, 5 a criticism partially substan-
tiated by Fritsche v. Turner,"0 which involved a lease containing
express provisions similar to the statutory procedure. The court
passed over this and did not apply or construe the method. 7
A Kansas statute comparable to the Nebraska statute just
discussed has been applied and construed in a number of cases.0 s
In one of these, Christiansen v. Virginia Drilling Co., 9 the Kansas
Supreme Court considered the applicability of the Kansas statute
to implied covenants. Held, the Kansas statute was applicable
only to a breach of express terms of the lease, on the ground that
there has been no breach of an implied covenant until judicially
determined.
Leases of Nebraska lands70 may be declared forfeited by the
Board of Educational Lands and Funds on default of the lessee
neglect, the lessor may proceed by affidavit of forfeiture, Id. § 57-203,
and provision is also made for a case. of a claim of non-forfeiture
by the lessee in answer to the affidavit of forfeiture. Id. § 57-204(1).
Also, in the case of such refusal to execute and record a surrender,
the lessor may, as an alternative, elect to bring suit to obtain the
surrender as he could without the benefit of the statutes. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 57-205 (Reissue 1952).
05 See Weaver, "Oil and Gas Leases in Nebraska," 21 NEB. L. REV.
104, 107-08 (1942).
06 133 Neb. 633, 637, 276 N.W. 403, 405 (1937). One writer, discussing
this case, said: "The lease provided that if any annual rental was
not paid within 30 days after becoming due, the lease could be cancelled
by the filing of an affidavit of nonpayment by the bank designated
as the depository for such rental payments. In an action in which, inter
alia, the lessor sought cancellation of this lease for failure of the
lesse to drill or pay the rental, the court held that the 'unless' clause
is to be strictly construed in favor of the lessor and against the lessee;
that in such a lease contract time is of the essence; and that failure
of the lessee to pay'the rental on the date stipulated automatically
terminated the lease contract, even though the lease provided for
cancellation in such event in another manner." Shokes, supra note
23, n. 8 at 375-76.
07 See note 66 supra. "So the parties making the lease were liable and
the lease was subject to cancellation. The district court ignored
this, probably because the lease itself provided, as shown in our
statement of the facts, for cancellation by another method...
Fritsche v. Turner, 133 Neb. 633, 637, 276 N.W. 403, 405 (1937).
68 See KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-201 - 06 (1949) and cases there
noted. Cf. Id. §§ 55-201-02; -205-6 (Supp. 1959).
69 170 Kan. 355, 226 P.2d 263 (1951).
70 See NEB. CONST. art. III, § 20; NEB. REV. STAT. c. 72, arts. 2-3, 5, 9
(Reissue 1958), as amended, Neb. Laws c. 333, § 1 (1959). Cf. Briggs
v. Neville, 103 Neb. 1, 170 N.W. 188 (1918). The term "lease" appears
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 39, 1960
in any of several particulars, 71 including failure "to perform any
of the covenants of the lease. ' 72 In cases involving defaults other
than failure to pay rentals, the Nebraska statute on educational
lands provides for notice, showing of cause, and a hearing.73
C. APPLIcATION
None of the cases and statutes so far discussed received any
application or construction by the court in the George case.
7 4
Discussion of Nebraska materials was perhaps urmecessary in the
George case, so far as the decision was concerned, but it is sub-
mitted that the absence of such discussion has produced an in-
consistency in Nebraska law at a time when some clarification
of our mineral law was both possible and desirable.
VI. FORFEITURE OF GRAVEL LEASES IN NEBRASKA
The result reached in the George case, as suggested earlier,
is generally accepted in the law of mineral leases. 75  The decided
weight of authority in the field of oil and gas law is in accord,7 6
and two oil and gas cases are cited in the George case, but each
to be used interchangeably with "permit" in NEB. REV. STAT. c. 72,
art. 3 (Reissue 1958). As to mineral leasing on school and saline
lands, see, in the order cited, Nebraska Enabling Act § 7, 13 Stat.
49 (1864); Ivanhoe Mining Co. v. Consolidated Mining Co., 102 U.S.
167, 175 (1880); Ely & Wheatley, "Mineral Titles and Tenure," ECO-
NOMICS OF THE MINERAL INDUSTRIES 81, 91-92 (1959); Pre-
emption Act § 10, 5 Stat. 456 (1841); 73 C.J.S. Public Lands § 91
(1951); 44 Stat. 1026 (1927); 48 Stat. 1185 (1934); State v. McMullen,
119 Neb. 739, 230 N.W. 677 (1930); NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-301
(Reissue 1958).
71 NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-235 (Reissue 1958). Forfeiture of leases of
saline lands is provided in case of default in .rental payments. Id.
§ 72-503. For other statutory provisions in this area, see Id. §§ 72-303
- 05, 901, 905; Neb. Laws c. 333, § 1 (1959).
72 NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-235 (Reissue 1958).
73 Ibid.
74 George v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 95 N.W.2d 609 (1959), did not involve
school land. The lease was evidently not recorded. See Record,
George v. Jones, supra. Although not discussed, NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 25-21,112-20 (Reissue 1956) would apparently apply. See Long v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 415, 89 N.W.2d 245, 249 (1958).
75 See notes 39-41 and 44 supra.
76 See MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 57, §§ 160, 221; 3 LINDLEY, op. cit.
supra note 9, § 862 at 2147; and materials there cited and in note
45 supra.
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is treated as mining authority.7 7  Are the oil and gas cases neces-
sarily applicable to a case involving sand and gravel? Professor
Merrill has pointed out that:
78
... [T]he peculiar nature of oil and gas and the conditions
under which oil and gas leases have been drawn and executed
have played havoc with the traditional rules of the law of landlord
and tenant. In spite of the general hostility of the law toward
forfeitures . . . a decided preponderance of the cases hold that
forfeiture of the lease is a proper remedy for the breach of
the implied covenants, either concurrently with the recovery of
damages, or as an alternative to that remedy, depending upon
the situation presented, or, in some cases, as the exclusive remedy.
It would seem that the "peculiar nature of oil and gas" and
the conditions under which oil and gas leases are drawn, which
have led to the general application of forfeiture as a remedy in
oil and gas cases, should at least caution against the use of oil
and gas lease cases as controlling in cases involving sand and gravel
leases. But any necessity for such caution has been denied by an in-
teresting argument advanced by the Supreme Court of Arkansas: 70
The case of Morley v. Berg, Ark., 235 S.W.2d 873 (opinion
delivered January 15, 1951), involved the removal of gravel;
and we there cited the oil and gas case of Mansfield Gas Co.
v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 133 S.W. 837. So the holdings in the
oil and gas cases apply to a case like this one, where there is
a grant, or lease of premises, for mining and removal of minerals,
and with the promise by the grantee to pay royalty.
If the George case is to be regarded as accepting this last
argument by implication, 0 the Nebraska oil and gas case of Long
v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.8 1 suggests an unexplained contradic-
tion in Nebraska case law. Although the Long case, as indicated
elsewhere,8 2 turned on express language of the lease involved,
77 Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167 133 S.W. 837 (1911);
Phillips v. Hamilton 17 Wyo. 41, 95 Pac. 846 (1908). Similar treat-
ment is accorded these cases, however, in Annot., 60 A.L.R. 901, 902-03,
908, 922-23 (1929), an annotation cited by the court in George v. Jones,
168 Neb. 149, 163, 95 N.W.2d 609, 616 (1959).
78 MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 57, § 160 at 362-63.
79 Mooney v. Gantt, 219 Ark. 485, 488-89, 243 S.W.2d 9, 11 (1951). See
also Cotner v. Mundy, 92 Okla. 268, 219 Pac. 321 (1923), cited in
George v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 162, 95 N.W.2d 609, 616 (1959); and
note 45 supra.
80 The idea is not discussed in the George case, but see notes 77 and
79 supra, and accompanying text.
81 166 Neb. 410, 89 N.W.2d 245 (1958). This case was not cited to the
court in the George case by attorneys for either side. Briefs, George
v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 95 N.W.2d 609 (1959). Cf. note 61 supra.
82 See note 61 supra, and accompanying text.
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the Nebraska court, quoting with approval from a Kansas case,8 3
said: 84
We find nothing in the contract providing for a forfeiture or
cancellation of the lease for the failure of the lessees to produce
oil and gas in paying quantities during the primary term of the
lease. The failure of lessees to produce or failure, alone, of
production in paying quantities during the primary term of the
lease did not result in a defeasance ipso facto. To hold otherwise
would be to read into the lease express provisions which did not
exist, and this we cannot do.
Another Nebraska case, Chesnut v. Master Laboratories,5 in-
volving a non-mineral lease, directly supports this view, citing a
West Virginia case in which a mining lease was so construed. 6
The court said in the Chesnut case: 8 7
Forfeitures of estate under leases are not favored in law and
the right to forfeit must be clearly stipulated. If a forfeiture
has not been stipulated for, a covenant or condition which is
merely implied, or an express one not clearly within the for-
feiture olause, will not sustain a claim of forfeiture for breach.
If then, in view of these cases, the lease is entirely silent, as
in the George case, both as to forfeiture and as to an obligation
to develop or to work the premises with reasonable diligence,
cancellation is seen to be a most extraordinary remedy.8 8 The
language and tenor of these earlier cases require at least an ex-
amination of the necessity of forfeiture in cases involving breach
of an implied obligation to work a gravel lease. If enforcement
of forfeiture as a remedy is a matter of discretion on the part of
a court of equity,8 9 and to be avoided unless clearly necessary,90
is there not a less drastic remedy available?
83 Baker v. Huffman, 176 Kan. 554, 557, 271 P.2d 276, 278 (1954).
84 Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 428, 89 N.W.2d 245,
256 (1958). Compare Pearson v. Ellithorpe, 48 N.D. 332, 184 N.W. 672
(1921), where the court applied the same principles, but appeared
influenced by a small minimum royalty provision.
85 148 Neb. 378, 27 N.W.2d 541 (1957).
80 Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S.E. 512
(1922).
87 Chesnut v. Master Laboratories, 148 Neb. 378, 390, 27 N.W.2d 541,
549 (1959). This case also was not cited to the court in the George
case by attorneys for either side. Briefs, George v. Jones, 168 Neb.
149, 95 N.W.2d 609 (1959).
88 The court in the George case recognized forfeitures as odius in law and
unfavored unless clearly necessary. George v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149,
162, 95 N.W.2d 609, 616 (1959). Cf. Annot., 60 A.L.R. 901, 922-26 (1929).
89 See Christiansen v. Virginia Drilling Co., 170 Kan. 355, 226 P.2d 263(1951). See also 19 AM. JUR. Equity §§ 84-87 (1939).
0 See note 88 supra.
FORFEITURE OF A GRAVEL MINING LEASE
VII. REMEDIES ALTERNATIVE TO FORFEITURE
The plaintiff in the George case relied upon forfeiture alone
as the remedy available where his damages at law would be in-
adequate. 91 It is true that ascertainment of damages in such
cases is problematical at best,92 but in view of the court's con-
clusion "that the capability of the gravel pit is no mystery, nor
is it an unknown quantity,"93 it does not necessarily follow that
the remedy of damages is wholly inadequate."4 If the mineral
involved is a solid mineral "in place" within a well-defined de-
posit, and damages are now more reliably ascertainable in oil
and gas cases, 95 should not geological and engineering testimony
in sand and gravel cases be even more reliable where the mineral
is not of a "fluid" nature? 96 Are damages at law "wholly inade-
quate" where measured by the stipulated royalty on the amount
which should reasonably have been produced but was not?97  But
even if damages at law are thought to be inadequate or too
difficult to determine, forfeiture is still not the only available
alternative.
VIII. THE ALTERNATIVE DECREE
Remedies alternative to forfeiture where damages are not
readily capable of measurement are recognized and such relief
may even be equitably more desirable.0 8 Chief among these is
the alternative decree, a remedy requiring further supervision of
the parties by the court, described by Professor Merrill as:99
... [R]equiring the lessee to do those things necessary to
fulfill his obligations under the implied covenant, within a time
91 Brief for Appellees, p. 22, George v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 95 N.W.2d
609 (1959). The lessees did not discuss the question. Brief for
Appellants, George v. Jones, supra.
92 See MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 57, § 157. Cf. Annot., 1915B L.R.A.
561. See also Michelsen v. Dwyer, 158 Neb. 427, 63 N.W.2d 513 (1954).
93 George v. Jones, 168 Neb. 149, 165, 95 N.W.2d 609, 617 (1959).
94 See 19 AM. JUR. Equity § 125 (1939); 1ERRILL, op. cit. supra note
57, § 158.
95 Ibid.
96 As to measure of damages, see Annot., 60 A.L.R. 901, 935-36 (1929).
97 When production is obtained, the lessor gains an additional royalty
on what might be considered the same material measured previously
by damages at law. But see the materials cited in note 92 supra.
98 See 19 AM. JUR. Equity §§ 86-87; MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 57,
§§ 168, 172. Cf. MERRILL, supra, §§ 173-75. See also Id. § 166 and
Id. § 170 (Supp. 1959).
99 MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 57, § 168 at 378-79.
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fixed by the court, the lease to be forfeited and cancelled, in
default of such performance. It will be noted that this is not
true specific performance of a contract, since the lessee is not
absolutely required to carry out the implied covenants ...
If the remedy of an alternative decree, which is said to have
originated in a case involving a mining lease,10 0 is receiving in-
creasing application in oil and gas cases' 0 ' where calculation of
damages is obviously most difficult, 0 2 such a remedy ought to
commend itself also to solid mineral cases. 0 3 An alternative de-
cree protects the lessor's interest as well as public and private
interests in the development of minerals in land'0 4 while also re-
lieving the lessee from an extraordinary penalty most odious
where not clearly stipulated, 0 especially if it is really the les-
see's desire to work the premises for the mutual benefit of both
parties. 06
IX. OBSERVATIONS ON GRAVEL LEASES
IN NEBRASKA
The Nebraska attorney accustomed to the ordinary law of
landlord and tenant'0 7 should, as indicated by the George case,
give careful consideration to the doctrine of implied obligations
as developed in mineral law if called upon to draft a sand and
100 Price v. Nicholas, 19 Fed. Cas. 1320 (No. 11415) (C.C. W.D. Va. 1878).
See MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 57, § 169 at 379.
101 See MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 57, § 171 at 384.
0l2 Id. § 157.
103 Especially if oil and gas cases are now precedent in Nebraska cases
involving solid minerals. See note 80 supra.
104 See, e.g., Annot., 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 417, 418 (1908).
103 See. e.g., Johnson v. Everidge, 308 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. App. 1957). Cf.
Chesnut v. Master Laboratories, 148 Neb. 378, 27 N.W.2d 541 (1947).
106 See Miller v. Mauney, 150 Ark. 161, 234 S.W. 498 (1921), where the
court observed: ". . . In other words, the lessees under such a
contract will not be allowed to speculate upon the chance of being
able at some indefinite and unreasonable time in the future to begin
and to continue the work of exploration and development required
of him under the covenants of his contract." Id. at 169, 234 S.W.
at 501.
107 See Chesnut v. Master Laboratories, 148 Neb. 378, 27 N.W.2d 541
(1947). Cf. 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 188 at 302; 3A THOMP-
SON, REAL PROPERTY § 1325 (repl. 1959); 32 AM. JUR. Landlord
and Tenant §§ 847-48 (1941); 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 104
(1947).
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gravel lease.108 He should provide against forfeiture during the
customarily inactive season'0 9 and give consideration to express
forfeiture and obligation provisions as a guard against implica-
tion of unwanted covenants and conditions. 10
There are other means by which an attorney for the lessor
under a sand and gravel lease may provide for diligent operation,
some of which have varying tax consequences.'11 The lessor may
compel operation by requiring a heavy fixed rent in lieu of roy-
alties during periods of non-operation; 112 by setting such a con-
sideration for the lease in lieu of royalties and whether the mine
is worked or not, that the lessee can be expected to work the
mine to pay the rent;113 or by requiring a minimum periodic
production, subject to royalties, from the property."1 4
If a Nebraska gravel lease does not contain express provisions
regarding development, operation, and forfeiture, it will be sub-
ject to the rules approved in the George case, and the court will
be justified in applying rules applicable to other types of percent-
108 There are a number of cases involving sand and gravel leases. See,
e.g., Thompson v. Clark, 221 Ark. 955, 257 S.W.2d 42 (1953); Mooney
v. Gantt, 219 Ark. 485, 243 S.W.2d 9 (1951); Morley v. Berg, 218 Ark.
195, 235 S.W.2d 873 (1951); Irving v. Ort, 146 N.E.2d 107 (Ind. App.
1957); Fifield v. Biesanz, 167 Minn. 399, 209 N.W. 259 (1926); Alex-
ander v. Grove Stone & Gravel Co., 237 N.C. 251, 74 S.E.2d 533 (1953);
Hurwitz v. Carolina Sand & Gravel Co., 191 N.C. 630, 132 S.E. 671
(1923). See also the general discussion in 36 AM. JUR. Mines and
Minerals § 59 at 321 (1941).
109 For a definition of the "active season" in sand and gravel operations,
See In re Grooms' Estate, 204 Iowa 746, 755, 216 N.W. 78, 82 (1927).
110 See 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 184 at 394 (1948). Cf. "Uranium
Mining Lease," 27 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 425, 440-45 (1955). There
are a number of ways in which obligations of the lessee can be
expressed. Perhaps most common are provisions for continuous
operation such as in Zelleken v. Lynch, 80 Kan. 746, 104 Pac. 563
(1909), and for operation in a workmanlike manner, as in Goody-
koontz v. White Star Mining Co., 94 W. Va. 654, 119 S.E. 862 (1923).
11 See SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF OIL AND GAS LAW § 245 (1955).
112 See, e.g., Hummel v. McFadden, 395 Pa. 543, 150 A.2d 856 (1959).
Delay rentals and advance royalties are beyond the scope of thi3
comment, but as to oil and gas leases in Nebraska, however, see NEB.
REV. STAT. § 57-219 (Reissue 1952).
113 See Jegon v. Vivian, L.R. 6 Ch. 742, 17 Eng. Rul. Cas. 843, 8 Mor.
Min. Rep. 628 (1871).
114 See McKnight v. Kreutz, 51 Pa. 232, 6 Mor. Min. Rep. 305 (1866).
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age leases, especially mineral leases dependent upon operation
alone for compensation to the lessor." 5
The sand and gravel lease has characteristics similar to those
of mining leases, oil and gas leases, and other types of percentage
leases."" The classification itself presents the outstanding fea-
ture distinguishing one type of percentage lease from another,
that is, the subject-matter of the lease involved. The importance
of effective testimony, including that of expert witnesses, and of
relevant evidence regarding diligence of operation need not be
limited to the issue of reasonable diligence, 1  because any effort
to distinguish a sand and gravel case from the many other min-
eral lease cases supporting drastic remedies in the lessor's favor
will depend upon such testimony." 8 This is because the stand-
ards of diligence felt necessary under other mineral leases, and
especially in oil and gas cases, arise in part from the nature of
the mineral involved." 9 It is submitted that even the standards
applied in cases involving other solid minerals ought not be ap-
plied automatically to sand and gravel cases, especially if the
nature of the mineral substance is such that radically different
methods of extraction are necessarily employed. 20
X. GRAVEL MINING IN NEBRASKA
The suggestion, just made, that sand and gravel exploitation
ought not be categorized automatically with other forms of min-
eral recovery, thereby receiving identical treatment, requires
further examination. What are some of the characteristics pe-
culiar to the sand and gravel industry in Nebraska which might
differentiate it from mining practices in other localities? Are
these differences such that a different standard of diligence might
be applied?
By way of introduction, it should be noted that, although
Nebraska is one of the few Great Plains states which does not
1"5 The attorney for the lessee in such a case will find himself faced
with an impressive array of cases supporting drastic remedies in
the lessor's favor. See the materials cited in note 56 supra.
116 See notes 7 and 18-23 supra, and accompanying text.
117 As to what constitutes reasonable diligence, see, e.g., 60 A.L.R. 901,
909-17 (1929); 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 183(b) (1948).
"18 See notes 56 and 76 supra, and 120 infra, and accompanying text.
119 See note 76 supra.
120 As to manner and extent of operation in general, see Annot., 60
A.L.R. 901, 909-21 (1929).
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figure in American metal mining, natural resources are not at
all lacking in the state.1 2 1  There has been increasing develop-
ment of non-metals within the state during recent years. Oil
and gas discovery and production has expanded greatly, but ex-
ploitation of other non-metals in Nebraska has been, and will
continue to be a significant part of state industry, particularly
in the field of rock products and other building materials.1 2
Deposits of sand and gravel are of such extent and quality that
exhaustion of deposits now producing will only require regular
development of future sources on new properties nearby.12 3 Such
a widely distributed resource lying at shallow depth' 2 4 lends it-
self well to exploitation by surface methods of mining. 125
Herein lies the first major distinction between gravel mining
in Nebraska and many other mining operations elsewhere. A
mineral deposit dipping steeply away from the surface or lying
at considerable depth requires underground mining practices, but
surface methods are more economical when the deposit is rela-
tively shallow and stratified roughly parallel to the surface. 2
High production costs in underground mining limit the amount
121 See, e.g., Lugn, "A review of the Natural Resources of Nebraska,"
NEBRASKA ON THE MARCH (June, 1952).
122 See Mullen, "tMineral Production in Nebraska in 1959," U.S. Bur.
Mines Mineral Industry Surveys, Area Report D-98 (Preliminary
1960). Among the non-fuels, sand and gravel, followed by stone, are
Nebraska's most important resources. In 1959, preliminary records
show that 10,800,000 tons of sand and gravel, valued at $8,200,000
and 3,700,000 tons of stone, valued at $4,900,000, were produced in
Nebraska. Id. at 2.
123 Nebraska sand and gravel deposits are of unusually good quality
and extend over much of the state, especially in the Platte River
valley. See Condra, "The Sand and Gravel Resources and Industries
of Nebraska," 3 NEBRASKA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 1 (1911).
124 Sand and gravel in the Platte River Valley, for example, underlies
some of the most valuable agricultural land in Nebraska-just below
the river-related water table which has made extensive irrigation
in the valley passible. See Merritt v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland
Cement Co., 136 Neb. 52, 285 N.W. 97 (1939).
125 Underground mining methods have been practiced occasionally in
Nebraska-notably southeast of Peru in Nemaha County (coal), and
southwest of Springfield in Sarpy County (limestone)-but open-cut
quarrying for stone and hydraulic dredging of sand and gravel have
been found most feasible in the state. See Condra, svpra note 123;
Mullen, "The Mineral Industry of Nebraska," 3 MINERALS YEAR-
BOOK (1957) 665-75 (1959). Cf. Pepperberg, "Coal in Nebraska,"
3 NEBRASKA GEOLIGICAL SURVEY 275 (1911).
126 See YOUNG, ELEMENTS OF MINING 401 (4th ed. 1946).
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of material which can be removed and require a high yield per
ton, while open-cut mining is typified by low per-ton yields, ex-
tensive removal of overburden, and large quantities of material
processed. 12 7 While underground mines are less affected by in-
clement weather, they are more susceptible to caving and flood-
ing, especially if left idle, and in such cases can be reopened only
at considerable expense, if at all.1 2 8 Although subsidence of the
surface can be a problem in underground mining districts, 129
open-cut mining entirely destroys the pre-existing surface.130
While all mining results in a substantial depletion or "wasting"
of realty,1 3 1 underground mineral deposits form a part of the
realty of the surface landowner which may be separated from the
fee title of the surface property owner. 32 Since gravel exploita-
tion in Nebraska is a surface operation, the doctrine of separate
estates is of little use, and in this special case the destruction of
the pre-existing surface may be beneficial. 133 In any event,
underground and surface mining have little in common.
Just as underground mining is distinguishable from surface
mining, so hydraulic dredging of sand and gravel, as practiced
127 See LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 15, at 219-22; YOUNG, op. cit. supra
note 126, at 401. An idea of the expensive nature of underground
mining may be gained from EATON, PRACTICAL MINE DEVELOP-
MENT AND EQUIPMENT (1934). Cf. 1-2 PEELE, MINING EN-
GINEERS' HANDBOOK §§ 3-27 (3d ed. 1941); VON BERNEWITZ,
HANDBOOK FOR PROSPECTORS AND OPERATORS OF SMALL
MINES 125-47 (4th ed. 1943).
128 See Behre & Arbiter, supra note 15, at 76-77. See also RICKARD,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MINING 60-62 (1932).
120 See 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 278 (1948).
130 If the material mined occurs directly at the surface, the pit is con-
sidered a quarry; if the material sought occurs below the surface
and the overburden is stripped away, the operation should be termed
open-cut, open-cast, open-pit, or strip mining. 1 STOCES, op. cit.
supra note 15, at 471-74. The distinction becomes important when
necessary to consider disposition of waste over-burden. See, e.g.,
Northern Illinois Coal Corp. v. 'Medill, 397 Ill. 98, 72 N.E.2d 844 (1947).
131 "The removal of minerals, whether held in solution upon the land or
resting in the soil and subsurface, is the removal of a component
part of the real estate itself." Fawn Lake Ranch Co. v. Cumbow,
102 Neb. 288, 295, 167 N.W. 75, 77 (1918). See also Behre & Arbiter,
supra note 15, 77-78.
132 See 2 TIFFANY, op cit. supra note 8, § 585, n. 24 (Supp. 1959).
133 As abandoned sand-pits are valued as recreational areas in Nebraska,
an owner of the surface estate may benefit from destruction of the
pre-existing surface. See Merritt v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland
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in Nebraska,13 4 is distinguishable from other types of surface min-
ing. Although it has been said that the same general rules of
law apply to quarries that govern other types of mining,135 sand
and gravel exploitation in Nebraska 136 is as distinct from mining
and quarrying in the usual sense as is placer mining, to some
forms of which it resembles, 37 and herein lies the second major
distinction in this area. A Nebraska gravel plant is not a quarry
or placer operation.
When, lastly, differences in price per unit, markets, tran-
sportation facilities, and available reserves are noted,'13 it is evi-
dent that the gravel lessee's attorney can introduce considerable
testimony reflecting upon the applicability of many if not most
of the cases permitting drastic remedies in case of breach of im-
plied obligations, as well as upon the issue of what constitutes
reasonably diligent operation.
XI. CONCLUSION
Because of the character and location of Nebraska gravel de-
posits,' 39 gravel leases have become an important part of mineral
recovery in the state. As Interstate and Defense Highway con-
struction in Nebraska extends westward from Grand Island
Cement Co., 136 Neb. 52, 285 N.W. 97 (1939). Cf. the lease in Powell
v. Cone, 100 Neb. 562, 160 N.W. 958 (1916). See also Persons, "Re-
wards of Land Rehabilitation," 61 ROCK PRODUCTS 62 (April
1958).
134 See, e.g., 50 ROCK PRODUCTS 88, 89-91 (October 1947).
135 1 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 13, § 85 at 100-01.
1386 See the materials cited supra notes 125 and 134.
137 Hydraulic mining by means of pumps and dredges should not be
confused with hydraulic placer mining by means of nozzles. As
to the latter, see Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co.,
18 Fed. 753, 756 (D. Calif. 1884); BOWIE, HYDRAULUIC MINING
(4th ed. 1891). Cf. Spooner, "Sand and Gravel: Three Methods of
Recovery," 52 ROCK PRODUCTS 82 (March 1949). Compare U.S.
Bur. Mines Inform. Circ. Numbers 6826 (1935); 6875 (1936); 6879
(1936) on dredging methods of sand and gravel production, and
Condra, supra note 123, with YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 126, at
468-81. See also 54 NEBRASKA BLUEPRINT 12-13, 40 (No. 4,
January 1955). An exhaustive discussion and bibliography of the sand
and gravel industry is found in LADOO & MYERS, NONMETALLIC
MINERALS 453-70 (2d ed. 1951).
138 See, e.g., Hummel v. McFadden, 395 Pa. 543, 150 A.2d 856 (1959).
See also Knowlton, "Growing Pains for Sand and Gravel Ready Mix
Industries," 59 ROCK PRODUCTS 58 (November 1956).
139 See notes 123-24 supra.
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through the Platte River valley,1 40 many small sand and gravel
leases can be expected to appear and compete with established
producers to supply aggregates for the highway, following the
pattern already established in the eastern area of the state. An
orderly development of the law applicable to mineral leases in
Nebraska is therefore a desirable goal; additional analysis of some
of the problems outlined herein would lend to that development.
It is suggested that if forfeiture is to be commonly applied
upon breach of obligations implied in mineral leases, some thought
ought to be given to the usual requirement of notice pre-requiste
to forfeiture, a matter not discussed in the George case.14 ' The
language of earlier opinions, left unexplained, marks the George
case as the broad introduction of a stringent rule to Nebraska
mineral law. It is to be hoped that the rule can be equitably
tempered according to the circumstances of individual cases. Pri-
marily, consideration of the alternative decree in the light of the
ordinary rules of real property and landlord and tenant would be
a forward step away from automatic application of an often in-
equitable remedy otherwise unfavored in Nebraska law.
Don H. Sherwood, '61
140 See 38 NEB. L. REV. 398 (1959). See also 58 NEBRASKA BLUE-
PRINT 12-13, 36 (No. 6, March 1960).
141 It is, however, alleged in plaintiffs' petition that the defendants
were "repeatedly warned" of their obligations. George v. Jones,
168 Neb. 149, 152, 95 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1959). As to the requirement
of notice, see MERRILL, op. cit. supra note 57, § 192; 58 C.J.S. Mines
and Minerals § 184(3) (1948). Cf. Cotner v. Mundy, 92 Okla. 268,
219 Pac. 321 (1927). See also Cannon v. Wilbur, 30 Neb. 777, 47
N.W. 85 (1890), and NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-202 (Supp. 1957); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 72-305 (Reissue 1958).
